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THE LEGALIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS AND THE FUTURE OF 
U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY 
DEREK P. JINKS* 
The accelerating pace of globalization and economic liberalization have 
placed traditional conceptions of state sovereignty under unprecedented strain.  
These processes have simultaneously enabled transnational actors to conceive 
of problems of governance as global and strengthened the commitment of these 
actors to the pursuit of common objectives through multilateralism.  The 
prospect of effective modes of “global governance” has, in turn, raised vexing 
questions about the optimal allocation of regulatory authority.  The territorial 
limitations of state regulatory power clearly limit the capacity of states to 
govern effectively with respect to many transnational problems. Nevertheless, 
the nation-state retains its status as the primary political actor in global 
politics.1  Indeed, global governance is mediated through international 
institutions whose design, legitimacy, and purpose originate in and derive from 
the authority of sovereign states. 
Because of these developments, national governments are, by and large, 
committed to the development of effective international institutions even as 
they strive to insulate national decision-making processes from international 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.  This response benefited 
greatly from the generous input of several colleagues including Harold Hongju Koh, Joel 
Goldstein, Ryan Goodman and David Sloss. 
 1. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
167, 168 (1999).  Although the optimal allocation of regulatory authority has certainly changed, 
nation-states continue to be the most important and influential actors in world society.  See, e.g., 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183, 184 (1997).  In fact, 
many scholars have argued that the regulatory capacity of states has not eroded significantly in 
the twentieth century.  See, e.g., STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 
(1999); Geoffrey Garrett, Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous 
Circle?, 52 INT’L ORG. 787, 788 (1998) (arguing that globalization has not significantly 
constrained domestic policy choices); Janice E. Thomson & Stephen D. Krasner, Global 
Transactions and the Consolidation of Sovereignty, in GLOBAL CHANGES AND THEORETICAL 
CHALLENGES: APPROACHES TO WORLD POLITICS FOR THE 1990s, at 195, 206 (Ernst-Otto 
Czempiel & James N. Rosenau eds., 1989) (arguing that state control over cross border flows has 
not significantly eroded); Janice E. Thomson, State Sovereignty in International Relations: 
Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Empirical Research, 39 INT’L STUD. Q. 213, 214 (1995) 
(“State control has waxed and waned enormously over time, regions, and issue-areas while the 
state’s claim to ultimate political authority has persisted for more than three centuries.”). 
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supervision.  United States human rights policy clearly exhibits this dual 
orientation to the international order. The United States has, of course, been an 
important player in the development and enforcement of international human 
rights law even as it has resisted the application of international human rights 
law to itself.2  The central problem is whether this contradiction—irrespective 
of whether it is understood as a “double standard” or a “structural tension” —
can be negotiated in principled and pragmatic ways.  In this Comment, I offer 
two suggestions to guide further exploration of this problem.  First, 
international lawyers and policy-makers must acknowledge that these 
contradictory impulses reflect deep conflicts between important liberal values.  
Second, international human rights law should address these conflicts directly 
through the elaboration of “principles of accommodation” that would define 
more clearly (and sensibly) the relationship between international and domestic 
law. 
Building effective institutions to define and enforce international human 
rights standards3 presents many confounding problems.4  Two types of 
concerns predominate. What norms should, as a matter of principle, qualify as 
universal human rights standards? And, what institutional arrangements would, 
as a practical matter, make violations of these standards (however defined) less 
likely and less frequent?  In his illuminating and inspirational essay, Harold 
Hongju Koh, Yale Law professor and former Assistant Secretary of State for 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, offers nothing less than a principled 
and pragmatic manifesto for U.S. human rights policy.5  Because I 
fundamentally agree with the substance of Professor Koh’s recommendations, 
I aim simply to clarify and analyze an important structural tension in the 
international legal and political order that greatly complicates the task of 
 
 2. See Jack Goldsmith, International Human Rights Law & the United States Double 
Standard, 1 GREEN BAG 365, 365 (1998). 
 3. The most prominent agreements are, in chronological order: the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 
U.N.T.S. 277; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, adopted, opened for signature and ratification Dec. 21, 1965, 60 U.N.T.S. 195; 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 
U.N.T.S. 3; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted, opened for 
signature, ratification and accession Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted Dec. 18, 
1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, adopted, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; and 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted  Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448. 
 4. See Laurence R. Helfer, Concretizing Human Rights Law, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.  
REV. 533, 535-36 (1998); HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY (Louis Henkin 
& John Lawrence Hargrove eds., 1994). 
 5. Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 293 (2002). 
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fashioning an appropriate U.S. human rights policy.  In short, I argue that the 
principled incorporation of international human rights norms into domestic law 
should be one of the pillars of U.S. human rights policy. 
As Professor Koh points out, two related macro-level developments are 
redefining the nature of world politics: the “globalization of freedom”6 and the 
“globalization of terror.”7  Since September 11th, the centrality of this tension 
is beyond dispute. Overemphasis of this dynamic, however, risks obscuring the 
contradictory impulses that have characterized the “globalization of freedom” 
itself.  More specifically, the “globalization of freedom,” at a high level of 
generality, has involved two related developments: the “globalization of 
human rights” and the “globalization of democracy.” In many important ways, 
these two trends are mutually reinforcing.  In at least one crucial sense, they 
are, however, arguably in tension.  The difficulty is clear: An increasingly 
precise body of universally-applicable human rights standards developed 
through various global associational processes will increasingly constrain the 
policy options of nation-states.  Democratic polities will be governed, in part, 
by exogenously-defined legal norms.  As a consequence, one of the most 
important challenges of the twenty-first century will be to articulate and 
institutionalize rules that govern the relationship between international law and 
domestic law. 
This problem is, of course, particularly acute for U.S. human rights policy. 
Although the United States actively promotes universal human rights 
standards, it also actively resists the application of international human rights 
norms in domestic law.  For example, courts in the United States routinely 
reject claims brought under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) without consideration of their merits because the President 
and Senate have attached conditions to U.S. ratification of the treaty.8  Both 
sides of this “double standard” reflect important principles of international 
society: state sovereignty and fundamental human rights.  The prospects for a 
durable, just international order turn on the degree to which these two 
principles are mediated.  My central thesis is that U.S. human rights policy 
should promote the legalization of international human rights standards by 
pursuing the “principled accommodation” of its national interests. 
 
 6. Id. at 295. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See, e.g., Domingues v. State, 961 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Nev. 1998); Newman v. Deiter, 702 
N.E.2d 1093, 1098-99 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 329 (1999); United States v. 
Any & All Radio Station Transmission Equip., 19 F. Supp. 2d 738, 741 (E.D. Mich. 1998), rev’d 
and remanded, 204 F.3d 658, 668 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Any & All Radio Station 
Transmission Equip., 976 F. Supp. 1255, 1256 (D. Minn. 1997), rev’d and remanded, 169 F.3d 
548, 554 (8th Cir. 1999), superseded by 207 F.3d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 2000); Ralk v. Lincoln 
County, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1380 (S.D. Ga. 2000). 
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I.  LEGALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS 
In the final decades of the twentieth century, international human rights 
institutions have assumed an increasingly legal character.9  This “legalization” 
of human rights institutions, which represents one instance of the broader trend 
of legalization of international institutions generally,10 is characterized by three 
 
 9. The ICCPR established the United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC or 
Committee) to monitor State parties’ compliance with the treaty.  See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 
40(4).  This monitoring function involves three complementary procedures.  First, the ICCPR 
establishes a periodic reporting process.  See id. at art. 40(1). Under the reporting process, the 
Committee receives periodic written reports from State parties which explain the measures they 
have taken to protect the rights recognized in the treaties.  See id.  Government representatives 
present the reports to the Committee in public sessions; Committee members question the 
representatives about issues raised in the reports and the Committee publishes comments and 
recommendations on how to improve the protection of human rights in the State in question.  
Second, the Committee drafts “general comments” typically concerning the interpretation of the 
substantive rights and freedoms contained in the treaty each Committee oversees.  See, e.g., 
DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 95 (1991) (“The general 
comments serve rapidly to develop the jurisprudence of the HRC under the Covenant.”).  Third, 
and most important, the Committee receives written “communications” or “petitions” from 
individuals alleging that a State party has violated one or more rights protected by the ICCPR.  
See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted, 
opened for signature, ratification and accession Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 [hereinafter 
First Optional Protocol]; Torkel Opsahl, The Human Rights Committee, in THE UNITED NATIONS 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 370 (Philip Alston ed., 1992).  This procedure is 
optional, however, and many States party to the ICCPR do not recognize the competence of the 
Committee to receive individual petitions.  See Human Rights Committee, at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/hrcommittee/hrc-page.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2002) 
[hereinafter Optional Protocol] (stating that 95 of the 144 parties to the ICCPR have ratified the 
First Optional Protocol).  Under the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, the Committee 
performs a quasi-judicial function when reviewing individual petitions.  If numerous admissibility 
requirements are satisfied, the Committee determines the merits of the complaint.  See TOM 
ZWART, THE ADMISSIBILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS PETITIONS: THE CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE (1994). Note that the 
Committee’s decisions are not legally binding, although many view them as persuasive authority, 
and several states have implemented the Committee’s interpretation of the treaty.  See Laurence 
R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 
107 YALE L.J. 273, 344 (1997). 
 10. See, e.g., Judith Goldstein et al., Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT’L ORG. 385 
(2000); Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of 
the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 709 (1999); see also THE ROLE OF LAW IN 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(Michael Byers ed., 2000).  One strong indicator of increasing levels of legalization in 
international institutions is the proliferation of international and supranational tribunals.  See 
generally MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (Philippe Sands et al. eds., 
1999) (compiling basic documents concerning all existing international judicial bodies, as well as 
several other quasi-judicial, implementation, control and dispute settlement mechanisms).  These 
include: the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (governed by U.N. CHARTER arts. 7(1), 36(3), 92-
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related developments: (1) increasingly obligatory norms; (2) increasingly 
precise norms; and (3) the delegation of authority to supranational bodies to 
interpret, implement, and apply these norms. 11 
Further legalization of international human rights institutions promises to 
strengthen substantially the durability and viability of international human 
rights regimes. Legalization tends to bolster the credibility of normative 
commitments,12 increase compliance with international norms,13 and provide a 
 
96); the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) (governed by U.N. Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), art. 287, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982)) (Part XV, § 2 of the UNCLOS is 
dedicated to the peaceful settlement of disputes and the ITLOS Statute is contained in Annex VI 
of the UNCLOS); the European Court of Human Rights (governed by Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, entered into force on Sept. 3, 1953, as 
amended by Protocol 11 to the European Convention on Human Rights, 213 U.N.T.S. 222); the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ) (governed by Treaty Establishing the 
European Economic Community, entered into force Jan. 1, 1958, 298 U.N.T.S. 11); the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (governed by Security Council 
Resolution on Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible 
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993)); the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) (governed by Security Council Resolution on 
Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in Rwanda, U.N. SCOR, 3453rd mtg. 
at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994)); and the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) dispute 
settlement mechanism (governed by General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, 33 
I.L.M. 1125, 1226-47 (1994)) (Annex 2: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes). 
 11. See Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L. ORG. 401 (2000) 
(defining the concept of international legalization as a form of institutionalization characterized 
by three dimensions: obligation, precision, and delegation). 
 12. See, e.g., LISA L. MARTIN, DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENTS: LEGISLATURES AND 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (2000); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft 
Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L. ORG. 421 (2000); Miles Kahler, Legalization as 
Strategy: The Asia-Pacific Case, 54 INT’L. ORG. 549 (2000); Miles Kahler, Conclusion: The 
Causes and Consequences of Legalization, 54 INT’L. ORG. 661 (2000). 
 13. See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: 
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 17-23 (1995); THOMAS M. 
FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995); Harold Hongju Koh, 
Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh, 
Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996). 
  Some empirical evidence suggests that the legalization of institutions does not 
necessarily increase levels of compliance.  See, e.g., Abbott & Snidal, supra note 12, at 421 
(noting the many advantages of “soft legalization”); Ellen L. Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, 
International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America, 54 INT’L. ORG. 633 (2000) 
(arguing that increased legalization does not explain increased compliance with human rights 
norms in Latin America); Ronald B. Mitchell, Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution 
and Treaty Compliance, 48 INT’L. ORG. 425 (1994) (suggesting that some international regimes 
are efficacious because their mechanisms for compliance are decentralized); John J. Mearsheimer, 
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highly rationalized mode of clarifying and resolving interpretive 
disagreements.14  The transformation of human rights norms into “hard law” 
also necessarily entails significant “sovereignty costs” in that national action is 
evaluated by international actors applying international norms. Moreover, 
these constraints on sovereignty are often concentrated in issue-areas that 
directly impact important national interests.15 
The range of justificatory practices utilized by states demonstrates the 
importance of these issues.  Broadly conceived, states employ two types of 
justifications for controversial practices.  First, states assert that unique 
contextual factors justify an idiosyncratic substantive interpretation of 
international human rights norms.16  Second, states suggest that extraordinary 
circumstances (that rise to the level of a national emergency) justify temporary 
suspension of certain fundamental international rights guarantees.  In 
international human rights law, “derogation regimes” define the degree to 
which states may suspend rights protections in formal states of emergency17 
and “limitations clauses” authorize restrictive interpretations of certain human 
rights norms when necessary to promote important national interests.18  These 
concepts are secondary or “interstitial” rules regulating the circumstances in 
which other rules, here the primary human rights norms, are applicable.19  I 
 
The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT’L SEC. 5 (1994) (arguing that 
international institutions do not have a significant impact on state behavior). 
 14. See, e.g., Robert Keohane et al., Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and 
Transnational, 54 INT’L. ORG. 457 (2000); Abbot & Snidal, supra note 12, at 421. 
 15. See DELEGATING STATE POWERS: THE EFFECT OF TREATY REGIMES ON DEMOCRACY 
AND SOVEREIGNTY (Thomas M. Franck ed., 2000); Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy 
and the Administrative Character of Supranationalism: The Example of the European 
Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 677 (1999); Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization, International 
Institutions, and the Erosion of National Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1944, 
1944-45 (1997) (arguing that the “practical devolution of decisionmaking authority to 
international institutions is the essence of the loss of national sovereignty” and that “it is a process 
that will continue as the forces of globalism accelerate in the next century”). 
 16. I have explored this theme in previous work.  See Derek P. Jinks, The Anatomy of an 
Institutionalized Emergency: Preventive Detention and Personal Liberty in India, 22 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 311 (2001). 
 17. See generally ANNA-LENA SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATES OF EXCEPTION (1998); JOAN FITZPATRICK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
CRISIS: THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM FOR PROTECTING RIGHTS DURING STATES OF 
EMERGENCY (1994); JAIME ORAA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATES OF EMERGENCY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1992). 
 18. See generally Alexandre Charles Kiss, Permissible Limitations on Rights, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 290 (Louis 
Henkin ed. 1981). 
 19. See Vaughn Lowe, The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character of Norm 
Creation Changing?, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, supra note 10, at 212-
21. 
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refer to these concepts as “accommodation principles,”20 in that they determine 
the degree to which international law authorizes departures from established 
international rules in certain specified “states of exception.”21 
Of course, states often also assert that domestic policy preferences 
concerning such sensitive matters cannot be meaningfully constrained by 
international human rights law because international human rights law acquires 
meaning only through the application of norms in domestic practices.22  In the 
 
 20. For an interesting discussion of a similar dynamic in the international trade context, see 
Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and 
Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 193, 194 (1996) (“It would seem clear 
that the [relevant] international agreement does not permit a national government’s determination 
always to prevail (otherwise the international rules could be easily evaded or rendered 
ineffective). . . .  [However, the very notion of sovereignty suggests that international bodies] 
should respect national government determinations, up to some point.”). 
 21. National security exceptions provide an excellent example. Hannes L. Schloemann and 
Stefan Ohlhoff described the problem succinctly. 
National security is the Achilles’ heel of international law. Wherever international law is 
created, the issue of national security gives rise to some sort of loophole, often in the form 
of an explicit national security exception.  As long as the notion of sovereignty exerts 
power within this evolving system, national security will be an element of, as an 
exception to, the applicable international law. 
Hannes L. Schloemann & Stefan Ohlhoff, “Constitutionalization” and Dispute Settlement in the 
WTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence, 93 AMER. J. INT’L L. 424, 426 (1999).  
“National security” may be invoked as a justification for the abrogation or qualification of 
international legal obligations in many issue areas including international trade law.  See The 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XXI, 55 U.N.T.S. 194; GUIDE TO 
GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 599-610 (rev. 6th ed. 1995).  Article XXI of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) provides for a general exception to all GATT obligations with 
respect to disclosure of national security information, regulation of fissionable materials, 
regulation of traffic in arms, and action in pursuance of U.N. Charter obligations related to the 
maintenance of international peace and security. See also JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL 
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 983-86 (3d ed. 1995); JOHN H. JACKSON, 
WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 748-52 (1969); Michael J. Hahn, Vital Interests and the 
Law of GATT: An Analysis of GATT’s Security Exception, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 558 (1991). 
 22. Many new constitutions explicitly make international law part of domestic law.  See, 
e.g., PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH BILLS OF RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 
(Philip Alston ed., 1999); S. AFR. CONST. ch. 14 § 232; see also The Human Rights Act of 1998 
(U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/19980042.htm 
(incorporating wholesale the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law).  In the 
United States, “foreign affairs exceptionalism”the notion that the usual constitutional 
constraints on the government’s power do not apply in matters relating to foreign affairshas 
recently come under tremendous strain.  See, e.g., G. Edward White, The Transformation of the 
Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1999); Jack L. Goldsmith, 
Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1618 (1997); Laurence 
H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1226 (1995).  The classic in this area 
remains LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 
1996). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
364 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:357 
United States, several scholars argue that constitutional principles preclude 
giving independent domestic legal effect to customary international law23 and 
certain types of treaties.24 
The question is whether international law imposes any “limitations on 
[these] limitations.”25  To what degree may states invoke contextual 
circumstances to justify specific domestic policy choices?  To what degree 
may states invoke contextual factors to justify restrictions on rights?  These 
questions are merely academic puzzles in an institutional environment 
unregulated by precise, obligatory norms.  These issues, however, will assume 
tremendous importance as international human rights law acquires more of the 
characteristics of a fully developed legal system.26 
The emerging tension between internationalism and constitutionalism 
threatens to compromise the ability of either approach to accomplish its central 
objective: the realization of humane and effective governance.  International 
 
 23. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as 
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 816 (1997); 
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of International 
Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260, 2260 (1998); Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist 
Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529 (1999).  The recent 
ascendancy of this view has prompted extensive critical commentary.  See, e.g., Harold Hongju 
Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998); Gerald L. 
Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors 
Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371, 371-72 (1997); Beth Stephens, The Law of 
Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law after Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 
395 (1997); Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga’s Firm Footing: International Human 
Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 471-72 (1997). 
 24. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. 
REV. 390, 391 (1998) (arguing that federalism concerns should invalidate treaties that do not 
regulate genuinely international matters); John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, 
Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 2093 (1999) 
(arguing that “courts should obey the presumption that when the text of a treaty is silent, courts 
ought to assume that it is non-self-executing,” meaning, in his view, that the treaty is not the 
“supreme law of the land”).  For an extended critique to Professor Bradley’s position, see David 
M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist 
Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1077 (2000).  For Professor Bradley’s 
rebuttal, see Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99 MICH. L. 
REV. 98 (2000).  For critical commentary on Professor Yoo’s thesis, see Martin S. Flaherty, 
History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law 
of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (1999); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2154-55 (1999). 
 25. See HENKIN & HARGROVE supra note 4, at 220-24 (describing the balance needed to 
adjudicate between preferred constitutional individual rights and the prevailing public interest). 
 26. See, e.g., HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 573 (2d ed. 2000) (“[I]nternational organizations with 
powers of elaboration, implementation, application and enforcement pose issues of state 
sovereignty in the most acute form.”). 
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human rights law must, therefore, fashion coherent “accommodation 
principles” that define more clearly the relationship between international and 
domestic law.27 
The challenge for U.S. human rights policy is to maximize the benefits 
while minimizing the costs of the legalization of human rights norms.  
International human rights institutions should be structured so as to 
accommodate reasonable domestic policy choices without compromising the 
normative integrity of international human rights agreements.  To further this 
objective, U.S. human rights policy should promote and accept as binding 
“accommodation principles” that take seriously both sides of this structural 
tension.  To illustrate the problem and proposed solution more clearly, I 
consider the example of U.S. anti-terrorism policy in the wake of the 
September 11th terrorist attacks.  After briefly analyzing a few important 
aspects the United States’ legal response to the terrorist attacks, I conclude that 
the United States must acknowledge that international human rights law 
constrains the available policy options even in the area of anti-terrorism (and 
even in the context of war). 
II.  LEGALIZATION AND THE PRINCIPLED ACCOMMODATION OF U.S. NATIONAL 
INTERESTS: THE EXAMPLE OF U.S. ANTI-TERRORISM POLICY 
Legislation enacted long before the September 11th terrorist attacks 
provides the foundation of the anti-terrorism regime in the United States.  The 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) authorizes 
the Secretary of State to designate an organization as a foreign terrorist 
organization if the Secretary finds that the organization is a foreign 
organization, the organization engages in terrorist activity, and the terrorist 
activity of the organization threatens the security of U.S. nationals or the 
national security of the United States.28  The designation by the Secretary of 
State results in blocking any funds that the organization has on deposit with 
any financial institution in the United States.  Representatives and certain 
members of the organization are then barred from entry into the United States.  
Perhaps most importantly, all persons within or subject to jurisdiction of the 
United States are forbidden from “knowingly provid[ing] material support or 
resources” to the organization.29 
 
 27. See José E. Alvarez, Multilateralism and its Discontents, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 393 (2000). 
 28. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §302, 
110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1998)). 
 29. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1998). Therefore, the designation of a group as a 
“foreign terrorist organization” under AEDPA has three legal consequences. First, United States 
financial institutions possessing or controlling any funds in which a designated foreign terrorist 
organization or its agent has an interest are required to block all financial transactions involving 
those funds. § 2339B(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1998). Second, representatives and specified members of a 
designated foreign terrorist organization are inadmissible to this country. 8 U.S.C. § 
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The Secretary’s power to designate groups as “terrorist” is, however, 
subject to judicial supervision.  For example, the law requires the Secretary of 
State to compile an administrative record supporting the findings that an entity 
is a foreign organization engaging in terrorist activities that threaten the 
national security of the United States.  This record serves as the basis for 
judicial review of the Secretary’s findings.  The Court of Appeals is to decide 
if the Secretary, on the face of things, had enough information to come to the 
conclusion that the organizations were foreign and engaged in terrorism, and 
the Secretary’s designation of one such organization as an alias of another is 
subject to the same scrutiny.  In addition, due process requires that the 
Secretary of State must give notice to a putative foreign terrorist organization 
that such a designation is impending, and the Secretary of State also must 
provide such an entity with the opportunity to present rebuttal evidence.30  
Furthermore, any prosecutions brought under the AEDPA must comply with 
the considerable requirements of U.S. constitutional criminal procedure; that 
is, the AEDPA does not establish separate procedures for the trial of 
individuals accused of terrorist activity. 
The USA Patriot Act of 2001 (USA Patriot Act), enacted in the aftermath 
of the September 11th attacks, establishes many important changes in U.S. 
law.31  Specifically, the USA Patriot Act (1) expands the wiretapping and 
intelligence gathering powers of the federal government;32 (2) grants the 
Attorney General the authority to certify that an alien meets the criteria of the 
terrorism grounds of the Immigration and Nationality Act, or “is engaged in 
any other activity that endangers the national security of the United States[,]” 
upon a “reasonable grounds to believe” standard, and take such aliens into 
custody;33 and (3) establishes a new criminal prohibition against harboring 
terrorists, similar to the current prohibition against harboring spies, and makes 
it an offense when someone harbors or conceals another they know or should 
have known had engaged in or was about to engage in federal terrorism 
 
1182(a)(3)(B) (Supp. IV 1998). Third, it is illegal for persons within the United States or subject 
to its jurisdiction to “knowingly” provide “material support or resources” to a designated foreign 
terrorist organization. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1998). The Act defines “material 
support or resources” to mean “currency or other financial securities, financial services, lodging, 
training, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, 
weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, 
except medicine or religious materials.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); see also 
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g) (4) (Supp. IV 1998). 
 30. See Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 208-09 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001), reh’g denied (Aug. 27, 2001). 
 31. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism  (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 STAT. 
272 (2001) [hereinafter USA Patriot Act]. 
 32. Id. §§ 201-25. 
 33. See id. § 412(a)(1)-(3). 
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offenses.34  Each of these changes constitutes an important expansion of 
federal law enforcement powers.  By way of illustration, I further explicate the 
provisions empowering the Attorney General to detain aliens. 
A. U.S. Anti-terrorism Law after September 11 
The USA Patriot Act grants the Attorney General the authority to certify 
that an alien meets the criteria of the terrorism grounds of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, or is engaged in any other activity that endangers the national 
security of the United States, upon a “reasonable grounds to believe” standard, 
and take such aliens into custody.35  The Attorney General must either begin 
removal proceedings against such aliens or bring criminal charges within seven 
days, or release them from custody.36  An alien who is charged but ultimately 
found not to be removable is to be released from custody.  An alien who is 
found to be removable but has not been removed, and “whose removal is 
unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future,” may be detained if the Attorney 
General demonstrates that release of the alien will adversely affect national 
security “or the safety of the community or any person.”37  Judicial review of 
any action taken under this section, including review of the merits of the 
certification, is available through habeas corpus proceedings, with appeal to 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.38  The Attorney 
General must review his certification of an alien every six months.39 
The upshot of these provisions is that the USA Patriot Act permits 
indefinite detention of immigrants and other non-citizens.  Section 412 requires 
that immigrants “certified” by the Attorney General be charged within seven 
days with a criminal offense or an immigration violation (which need not be on 
terrorism grounds).40  That is, the USA Patriot Act does not require that those 
who are detained indefinitely be removable because they are terrorists.  For 
example, it authorizes indefinite detention of immigrants based upon an 
immigration status violation (such as overstaying a visa) if the Attorney 
General is unable to deport any such immigrant, as is the case when the 
deportable immigrant’s country refuses to accept them.  Detention is allowed 
on the Attorney General’s finding of “reasonable grounds to believe” the 
immigrant involved in terrorism or activity that poses a danger to national 
security; and indefinite detention is authorized following a determination that 
 
 34. See id. § 803. 
 35. See id. § 412(a)(1)-(3). 
 36. USA Patriot Act, § 412(a)(5). 
 37. Id. § 412(a)(6). 
 38. Id. § 412(b). 
 39. Id. § 412(a)(7). 
 40. Id. § 412(a)(5) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (2000) by adding §§ 236A(a)(3), 
236A(a)(6)). 
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such an individual threatens national security, or the safety of the community 
or any person.41 
This broad detention power arguably curtails fundamental constitutional 
guarantees.  For example, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the indefinite 
detention of immigrants who could not be deported poses a “serious 
constitutional problem.”42  The Supreme Court did not allow the government 
to hold such immigrants, even those who the government said were dangerous 
and who did not have a right to remain in the United States, for longer than 
would be “reasonably necessary” to secure removal from the U.S.43  Although 
the Court did not address indefinite detention of persons ordered removed on 
terrorism grounds,44 the Court made clear that such detention would violate the 
Constitution without “strong procedural protections.”45  Moreover, the Court 
emphasized that indefinite detention would not be allowed “broadly [for] 
aliens ordered removed for many and various reasons, including tourist visa 
violations.”46 
In this way, the USA Patriot Act arguably fails to satisfy the minimum 
constitutional requirements outlined by the Supreme Court.  Under the USA 
Patriot Act § 412, immigrants who are ordered removed but cannot be deported 
in the reasonably foreseeable future are entitled to reviews, at least each six 
months, of whether they continue to pose a danger.47  But the USA Patriot Act 
provides for indefinite detention without a trial, or any other adversarial 
hearing, in which the government would have to prove that any such 
immigrant is engaged in terrorist activity.  Moreover, it authorizes indefinite 
detention merely on the basis of vague allegations of threats to national 
security. 
B. Arbitrary Detention and International Human Rights Law 
Pursuant to these provisions (and an emergency interim regulation 
promulgated by the Attorney General),48 the United States has detained well 
over 1000 individuals in connection with its investigation of the September 
11th attacks.  These expanded law enforcement powers are in many respects 
inconsistent with international human rights standards.  For example, the 
detention provisions of the USA Patriot Act authorize deprivations of personal 
liberty without sufficient procedural or substantive guarantees.  In this respect, 
the detentions under § 236 arguably constitute “arbitrary detention” within the 
 
 41. Id. § 412(a)(3)-(6). 
 42. Zadvydas v. Davis, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 2498 (2001). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 2499. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. USA Patriot Act, § 412 (a)(6)-(7), 115 STAT. at 350-51. 
 48. See Disposition of Cases of Aliens Arrested Without Warrant, 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (2001). 
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meaning of prevailing international legal standards.  Under Article 9(1) of the 
ICCPR, however, no one shall be “subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention”49 
or “deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such 
procedure as are established by law.”50  The “principle of legality” recognized 
in this provision purports to regulate both the substantive grounds upon which 
the detention or arrest is based, and the procedure utilized to effect and confirm 
the arrest or detention.51  “Law” in this provision references the general 
principles central to the “rule of law” including the requirement that abstract, 
accessible, and generally applicable norms dictate the substance and procedure 
of any deprivation of personal liberty.  Although the ICCPR does not provide a 
list of the grounds upon which detentions may be ordered, the prohibition of 
arbitrariness does ensure that the law itself is not arbitrary.  That is, the 
deprivation of liberty is not “manifestly unproportional, unjust or 
unpredictable, and [that] the specific manner in which an arrest is made must 
not be discriminatory and must be able to be deemed appropriate and 
proportional in view of the circumstances of the case.”52  Definitions of 
terrorism for which non-nationals can be detained or deported under the USA 
Patriot Act are impermissibly broad and include membership in, or any 
“material support” for, any foreign or domestic organization designated as a 
“terrorist organization” by the Secretary of State or any group that publicly 
endorses acts of terrorism, and membership in or support for (including 
soliciting funds) any group not designated as “terrorist” but deemed to support 
terrorism in some way.  In the latter cases, the burden is placed on the detainee 
to prove that his or her assistance was not intended to further terrorism. 
Article 9(2) of the ICCPR provides that “[a]nyone who is arrested shall be 
informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be 
promptly informed of any charges against him.”53  These provisions mandate 
that anyone who is arrested must be informed of the general reasons for the 
arrest “at the time of arrest,” while formal legal charges or accusations must be 
furnished “promptly.”54  There must be sufficient information in these 
 
 49. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 9(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 175. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR 
COMMENTARY 174-76 (1993) (proscribing both the right to be informed and special rights for 
persons in custody). 
 52. See id. at 173; see also Womah Mukong v. Cameroon, Comm. No. 458/1991, U.N. Hum. 
Rts. Comm., 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991, at 12 (1994), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/vs45851e.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2002). 
 53. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 9(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 175. 
 54. NOWAK, supra note 51, at 174-75. 
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disclosures to permit the detainee to challenge the legality of his or her 
detention.55 
Article 9(3) provides that all persons arrested or detained on a criminal 
charge “shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by 
law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable 
time or to release.”56  Although no bright line test for “promptness” has 
emerged, the HRC held that an individual must be brought before a judge or 
other officer within “a few days.”57  The ICCPR also provides for the right to 
 
 55. See id. at 175; see also Caldas v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 43/1979, U.N. Hum. Rts. 
Comm., U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/38/40), at 192 (1983), available at http://www1.umn.edu/ 
humanrts/undocs/session38/43-1979.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2002). 
 56. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 9(3). Note that Article 9(3) of the ICCPR applies only to 
individuals arrested or detained on a criminal charge, while the other rights recognized in the 
Article apply to all persons deprived of their liberty. People awaiting trial on criminal charges 
should not, as a general rule, be held in custody. In accordance with the right to liberty and the 
presumption of innocence, persons charged with a criminal offence, in general, should not be 
detained before trial. See id. art. 14(3). International standards explicitly recognize that there are, 
however, circumstances in which authorities may detain an accused pending trial. See id. art. 
9(3); see also Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention 
or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp No. 49, at 39, U.N. Doc. 
A/43/49 (1988) [hereinafter Body of Principles], available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/ 
instree/g3bpppdi.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2002); United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for 
Non-custodial Measures (The Tokyo Rules), G.A. Res. 45/110, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. 
No. 49A, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ 
i6unsmr.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2002); American Convention on Human Rights, July 18, 1978, 
art. 7.5, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/zoas3con.htm 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2002) [hereinafter ACHR]. For example, pre-trial detention is permissible if 
authorities determine that detention is necessary to prevent flight, interference with witnesses, or 
when the accused poses a clear and serious risk to others which cannot be contained by less 
restrictive means. See Van Alphen v. The Netherlands, Comm. No. 305/1988, U.N. Hum. Rts. 
Comm., 39th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/39/D/305/1988, at 115 (1990), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf (last visited Mar. 12, 2002) (document can be located via 
“SEARCH THE DATABASE,” and “Hugo van Alphen;” or search “By Country,” then 
“Netherlands,” and the U.N. Doc. number). Therefore, pre-trial detention must not only be lawful, 
but must also be necessary and reasonable in the circumstances. 
 57. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 8, Article 9, Compilation of General 
Comments and General Recommendations, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 16th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. 
HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 8 (1994) (adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/hrcom8.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2002). Note that this 
provision does not explicitly recognize a right to counsel for all accused at this stage of the 
proceedings. The Human Rights Committee has stated, however, that “all persons [] arrested must 
[have] immediate[] access to counsel . . . .” See Human Rights Committee, Concluding 
Observations on Georgia, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 59th Sess., 1564-1566th mtg., at 28, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.74 (1997) available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/hrcommittee/ 
Georgia97.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2002).  Arguably this right is implicit in the nature of the 
protection at issue in Article 9(3), but the lack of a clear requirement precludes universalization of 
this interpretation. Other non-binding international resolutions do, however, clearly indicate that 
the law is moving in this direction. See, e.g., Body of Principles, supra note 56, at princ. 18(1); 
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habeas corpus, or amparo.58  Under this provision, anyone deprived of liberty 
by arrest or detention has the right to “take proceedings before a court, in order 
that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and 
order his release if the detention is not lawful.”59  Moreover, this provision 
implies that the detainee has the right to continuing, periodic review of the 
lawfulness of his or her detention.60  Clearly, the seven-day, extra-judicial 
detention authorized by the USA Patriot Act departs from prevailing 
international standards. 
III.  TOWARD THE PRINCIPLED ACCOMMODATION OF U.S. NATIONAL 
INTERESTS 
United States officials justify deprivations of these rights by asserting, not 
without some validity, that the unique and grave threat of terrorism requires 
exceptional law enforcement measures.61  International human rights treaties 
 
Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, 8th U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 at 118 (1990), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_comp44.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2002) (stating that 
“[a]ll persons are entitled to call upon the assistance of a lawyer of their choice to protect and 
establish their rights and to defend them in all stages of criminal proceedings.”); Id. at princ. 7 
(requiring governments to ensure that all persons arrested or detained have access to a lawyer 
within forty-eight hours from arrest or detention); See also id. at princ. 5 (providing that all 
persons arrested, charged or detained must be promptly informed of their right to legal 
assistance); Id. at princ. 8 (requiring authorities to ensure that all arrested, detained or imprisoned 
persons have adequate opportunities to be visited by and to communicate with their lawyer 
without delay, interception or censorship, in full confidentiality). It also has been widely 
recognized that prompt and regular access to a lawyer for all detainees is an important safeguard 
against torture, ill-treatment, coerced confessions and other abuses. See, e.g., Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment 20, Article 7, Compilation of General Comments and General 
Recommendations, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 44th Sess., at 11, U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 30 
(1994) (adopted by  U.N. Human Rights Treaty Bodies), available at http://www1.umn.edu/ 
humanrts/gencomm/hrcom20.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2002); U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 41st Sess., at para. 284, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1994/31 (1994). 
 58. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 9(4). 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Body of Principles, supra note 56, at princs. 11(3), 32, 39. 
 61. See, e.g., Attorney General John Ashcroft, Remarks to the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary (Sept. 25, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2001/ 
agcrisisremarks9_25.htm. 
The American people do not have the luxury of unlimited time in erecting the necessary 
defenses to future terrorist acts. The danger that darkened the United States of America 
and the civilized world on September 11 did not pass with the atrocities committed that 
day. Terrorism is a clear and present danger to Americans today. Intelligence information 
available to the FBI indicates a potential for additional terrorist incidents. This new 
terrorist threat to Americans on our soil is a turning point in America’s history. It is a new 
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allow the suspension of some rights in public emergencies.62  Article 4 of the 
ICCPR is representative.  For example, it provides that in situations threatening 
the life of the nation, a government may issue a formal declaration suspending 
certain human rights guarantees as long as (1) a state of emergency that 
threatens the life of the nation exists;63 (2) the exigencies of the situation 
 
challenge for law enforcement. Our fight against terrorism is not merely or primarily a 
criminal justice endeavor—it is defense of our nation and its citizens. We cannot wait for 
terrorists to strike to begin investigations and make arrests. The death tolls are too high, 
the consequences too great. We must prevent first, prosecute second. 
Id. 
 62. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., art. 15(1) (1950) (entered into force Mar. 9, 1953) [hereinafter “ECHR”] 
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/convention/webConvenENG.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 
2002): 
In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High 
Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this 
Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that 
such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law. 
Id. 
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of 
which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take 
measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not 
inconsistent with their other obligations under international law . . . . 
ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4(1). 
In time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence or 
security of a State Party, it may take measures derogating from its obligations under the 
present Convention to the extent and for the period of time strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other 
obligations under international law . . . . 
ACHR, supra note 56, art. 27(1). 
  The African Charter does not contain a provision allowing States to derogate from their 
obligations under the treaty in times of public emergency.  See African [Banjul] Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58, available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z1afchar.htm. 
 63. See SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at 195-281; FITZPATRICK, supra note 17; 
Fionnuala Ni Aolain, The Emergence of Diversity: Differences in Human Rights Jurisprudence, 
19 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 101, 103 (1995) (arguing that the concept of a “state of emergency refers 
to those exceptional circumstances resulting from temporary factors of a political nature, which, 
to varying degrees, involve extreme and imminent danger that threaten the organized existence of 
the state’); Fionnuala Ni Aolain, The Fortification of an Emergency Regime, 59 ALB. L. REV. 
1353, 1367 (1996) (concluding that a state of emergency may be declared “only if an exceptional 
situation of crisis or emergency exists which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat 
to the organized life of the community of which the state is composed can a derogation be 
invoked.”) (internal citations and alterations omitted) [hereinafter Ni Aolain, Fortification of an 
Emergency Regime]; The Lawless Case (Merits), Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., at para. 28 (Nov. 14, 1960) 
(holding that the ECHR’s derogation clauses may be invoked only in “an exceptional situation of 
crisis or emergency which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised 
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“strictly require” such a suspension;64 (3) the suspension does not conflict with 
the nation’s other international obligations;65 (4) the emergency measures are 
applied in a non-discriminatory fashion66 and (5) the government notifies the 
United Nations (U.N.) Secretary-General immediately.67  The only rights that 
are not subject to suspension in this situation are those specified in Article 4 as 
protected from derogation.68  The ICCPR specifically identifies several non-
derogable obligations including the rights to be free from arbitrary killing;69 
torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment70 and 
slavery.71  Although the rights to fair trial and personal liberty are derogable 
provisions, the Human Rights Committee has suggested that restrictions of 
 
life of the community of which the State is composed”), available at 
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/staff/arubin/L201/L201.html.  The concept of emergency does include 
circumstances other than armed conflict. For example, national disasters and extreme economic 
crises may constitute “public emergencies.”  See R. St. J. Macdonald, Derogations Under Article 
15 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 225, 225 (1997). 
Furthermore, the emergency must be temporary, imminent, and of such a character that it 
threatens the nation as a whole.  See SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 17; ORAA, supra note 
17, at 11-33. 
 64. This requirement incorporates the principle of proportionality into derogation regimes. 
This principle requires that the restrictive measures must be proportional in duration, severity, 
and scope. Implicit in this requirement is that ordinary measures must be inadequate; and the 
emergency measures must assist in the management of the crisis. See, e.g., ORAA, supra note 17, 
at 143; Macdonald, supra note 63, at 233-35. 
 65. See SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at 624-39. 
 66. Id. at 640-82. 
 67. Id. at 683-718; ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4(3); ECHR, supra note 62, art. 15(3); ACHR, 
supra note 56, art. 27(3). The Human Rights Committee has emphasized the importance of 
notification for effective international supervision of derogations in states of emergency. See 
Annual Report of the Committee to the General Assembly, Through the Economic and Social 
Council, Under Article 45 of the Covenant and Article 6 of the Optional Protocol, U.N. GAOR, 
36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex VII, at 110, U.N. Doc A/36/40 (1981). 
 68. Each convention containing a derogation clause provides an explicit list of non-
derogable provisions.  See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4(2) (prohibiting derogation from Articles 6 
(right to life), 7 (prohibition on torture), 8 (prohibition of slavery and servitude), 11 
(imprisonment for failure to fulfill contractual obligation), 15 (prohibition on retrospective 
criminal offence), 16 (protection and guarantee of legal personality), and 18 (freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion)); ECHR, supra note 62, art. 15(2); 213 U.N.T.S. at 232  (prohibiting 
derogation from Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (freedom from torture), 4 (freedom from slavery), and 
7 (retrospective effect of penal legislation)); ACHR, supra note 56, art. 27; Suspension of 
Guarantees, Interpretation, and Application, July, 1970, 9 I.L.M. 683 (prohibiting suspension of 
Articles 3 (right to juridical personality), 4 (right to life), 5 (right to humane treatment), 6 
(freedom from slavery), 9 (freedom from ex-post facto laws), 12 (freedom of conscience and 
religion), 17 (right of the family), 18 (right to name), 19 (right of child), 20 (right to nationality), 
and 23 (right to participate in government)). 
 69. See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 6. 
 70. See id. art. 7. 
 71. See id. art. 8. 
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these rights are inappropriate even in times of emergency.72  The Committee, 
following the lead of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,73 strongly 
suggested that the right to habeas corpus (or amparo) is non-derogable.74 
In this way, international human rights treaties authorize states to restrict 
or suspend some rights, subject to several requirements, for an identified set of 
important public policy objectives.75  These “states of exception,” strike a 
balance between universal human rights norms and national interests by 
specifying the circumstances in which derogations may be enacted lawfully.76  
 
 72. Although the Human Rights Committee recommended against adopting an Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR re-categorizing Articles 9 and 14 as non-derogable, the Committee noted 
that states should not derogate from several of the protections included in these articles. The 
Committee reasoned that: 
The Committee notes that the purpose of the possible draft optional protocol is to add 
article 9, paragraphs 3 and 4, and article 14 to the list of non-derogable provisions in 
article 4, paragraph 2, of the Covenant. Based on its experience derived from the 
consideration of States parties’ reports submitted under article 40 of the Covenant, the 
Committee wishes to point out that, with respect to article 9, paragraphs 3 and 4, the issue 
of remedies available to individuals during states of emergency has often been discussed. 
The Committee is satisfied that States parties generally understand that the right to habeas 
corpus and amparo should not be limited in situations of emergency. Furthermore, the 
Committee is of the view that the remedies provided in article 9, paragraphs 3 and 4, read 
in conjunction with article 2 are inherent to the Covenant as a whole. Having this in mind, 
the Committee believes that there is a considerable risk that the proposed draft third 
optional protocol might implicitly invite States parties to feel free to derogate from the 
provisions of article 9 of the Covenant during states of emergency if they do not ratify the 
proposed optional protocol. Thus, the protocol might have the undesirable effect of 
diminishing the protection of detained persons during states of emergency. 
Human Rights Committee Annual Report to the U.N. General Assembly, U.N. G.A.O.R., 49th 
Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex IX, at para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994) [hereinafter Human Rights 
Committee Annual Report ]. 
 73. See Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2) and 7(6) of the American 
Convention on Human Rights), Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. A) No. 8, at 33, OEA/ser.L./V/III.17, doc. 
13 (1987) available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11_4h.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 
2002). See also Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 and 8 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights), Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. A) No. 9, at 41, 
OEA/ser.L./VI/III.9, doc. 13 (1987) available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/ 
b_11_4i.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2002). The Court unanimously held that “‘essential’ judicial 
guarantees which are not subject to derogation, according to Article 27(2) of the Convention, 
include habeas corpus (Art. 7(6)), amparo, and any other effective remedy before judges or 
competent tribunals (Art. 25(1)) . . . .”  Id. 
 74. Human Rights Committee Annual Report, supra note 72. 
 75. For useful surveys of this area of law, see SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 17; 
FITZPATRICK, supra note 17; ORAA, supra note 17. 
 76. See generally SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 17 (providing an exhaustive 
examination of the relevant treaty provisions and case-law). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2002] THE LEGALIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS 375 
This dimension of accommodation is central since states often justify rights 
restrictions by appeal to emergency conditions.77 
In light of these concerns, how much should the concern for sovereignty 
over such sensitive matters as anti-terrorism law after September 11 affect the 
participation of United States in international human rights regimes?  The 
international law pertaining to “states of exception” provides an excellent 
example of the ways in which the United States might incorporate international 
norms without sacrificing sovereign autonomy in matters affecting national 
security.  Under international human rights law, the United States may suspend 
various rights protections provided that such derogations are strictly required 
to meet the challenges posed by an emergency threatening the polity.  These 
modest, but important, international legal requirements grapple with the 
structural tension between state sovereignty and universal justice.  
International human rights law must effectively constrain the ambitions of 
national governments.  At the same time, fundamental threats to democracy 
(such as terrorism) might require a temporary suspension of certain rights to 
protect liberty in the long run.  Recognizing the sovereign prerogative of states 
to make such choices, international human rights norms strive to condition the 
exercise of this power.  In many respects, this “principled accommodation” of 
national interests reveals that international human rights law, properly 
conceived, poses no menacing threat to constitutionalism and democracy.  That 
is, international human rights law in no way constrains the legitimate 
ambitions of national governments. 
IV.  CONCLUSION: LEGALIZATION, DOUBLE STANDARDS, AND U.S. HUMAN 
RIGHTS POLICY 
The United States, like most national governments, resists any 
encroachment by outsiders on the sphere of autonomy over internal affairs.  
Indeed, the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of states is, in 
many respects, a necessary corollary to sovereign equality.  International 
 
 77. For example, several governments point to emergency conditions to justify practices 
otherwise inconsistent with the ICCPR.  See, e.g., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 1977, U. N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/1/Add.17, 3d. Sess., 67th mtg., Agenda Item 4 (1977) (discussing report filed by 
United Kingdom under Article 40 of Covenant); Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 1977, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/1/Add.25, 4th Sess., 59th mtg., Agenda Item 4 (1978) (discussing report filed by 
Chile Under Article 40 of Covenant); Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties 
Under Article 40 of the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/1/SR.221, 10th Sess., 221st mtg. Agenda 
Item 4 (1980) (discussing report filed by Columbia under Article 40 of Covenant); Uruguay, in 
Annual Report of the Committee to the General Assembly: 6th Report, at 365, para. 265, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/1/Add.57, 355th-357th, 359th, 373rd mtg. (1982) (discussing report filed by 
Uruguay under Article 40 of Covenant). 
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human rights law seems to violate these principles by opening states to outside 
investigation, influence, and criticism.  International (and supranational) 
institutions serve to hold states accountable to other states for their legal 
commitments to respect human rights.  In this important sense, international 
human rights law elevates the sensitive relationship of a state to its own 
citizens to a matter of international concern.  This development, if taken 
seriously, strikes at the very core of state sovereignty.  Through reporting 
procedures to U.N. treaty bodies, states engage in the unprecedented activity of 
self-assessment and disclosure of non-compliance to outsiders.  In so doing, 
states send representatives to respond to questioning and are condemned for 
violations in the treaty bodies’ reports.  Furthermore, through political bodies, 
such as the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, states are subject to formal 
condemnation and even risk resolutions and sanctions by the U.N. Security 
Council.  Given the trend toward further legalization of international human 
rights institutions, states will likely become more concerned about the 
imposition of exogenously-defined norms purporting to regulate state action in 
areas traditionally considered matters of domestic jurisdiction. 
The progressive development of international human rights law, and in 
particular the emergence of increasingly legalized international organizations, 
has reinforced the political and economic interdependence of many nations.  
With this interdependence comes the inevitable tension between the need to 
adhere to international obligations and the wish to retain state sovereignty.  
States will, of course, struggle to retain sovereign authority to make 
fundamental policy choices consistent with national values and needs. 
Nevertheless, all states must accept constraints on their freedom of action in 
order to obtain the considerable benefits of collective, supranational regulation 
and to promote more humane systems of governance. 
 
